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Drone Law: A Reply to 
UN Special Rapporteur Emmerson 
MICHAEL N. SCHMITT* 
INTRODUCTION 
In January 2013, Ben Emmerson, the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
While Countering Terrorism, began examining the use of  remotely piloted 
aircraft (RPA or “drones”) in extraterritorial lethal targeting, commonly 
labeled “targeted killing.” The following October, he released an interim 
report surveying the legal framework for the operations.1 It came on the 
heels of  a report on the same topic by UN Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Christof  Heyns.2 The two 
documents marked a sea-change in the ongoing debate over RPAs. 
Sophisticated yet accessible, the reports surgically dissected jus ad bellum 
(law governing the resort to force by States), jus in bello (international 
humanitarian law or IHL), and human rights norms. Together, they helped 
disentangle the often emotive, counter-factual and counter-normative 
dialogue that had obfuscated objective analysis.3 
                                                          
* Director and Charles H. Stockton Professor, Stockton Center for the Study of  International 
Law, United States Naval War College; Professor of  Public International Law, University of  Exeter 
Law School. The views expressed are those of  the author in his personal capacity. 
1. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Rep. of  the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of  
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/68/389 (Sept. 18, 
2013) (by Ben Emmerson). 
2. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Rep. of  the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/68/382 (Sept. 13, 2013) (by 
Christof  Heyns). 
3. For a discussion of  the reports, as well as reports released by Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, see Michael N. Schmitt, Narrowing the International Law 
Divide: The Drone Debate Matures, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 (2014), 
http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-39-schmitt-narrowing-the-international-law-divide.pdf. For a 
comprehensive survey of  the legal issues, see Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: 
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This March, Emmerson released his 2013 annual report.4 It analyzes 
thirty-seven RPA strikes involving civilian casualties, proffers a sample 
strike analysis, and includes recommendations. In the report, Emmerson 
invites States to answer various legal questions regarding which “there is 
currently no clear international consensus, or where current practices and 
interpretations appear to challenge established legal norms.”5 States are to 
do so in advance of  the 27th Session of  the Human Rights Council in 
September.6 For Emmerson, “[l]egal uncertainty in relation to the 
interpretation and application of  the core principles of  international law 
governing the use of  deadly force in counter-terrorism operations leaves 
dangerous latitude for differences of  practice by States. . . . [T]hus an 
urgent and imperative need to reach a consensus” exists.7 I agree. 
This essay examines Emmerson’s queries — replicated verbatim 
below — in an effort to assist States that answer his call. For States that do 
not, the analysis can serve as a useful tool in evaluating the responses of  
other States, as well as refining their own legal policy positions regarding 
RPA operations. Although I offer my own views, I make every effort to 
highlight competing positions. 
THE EMMERSON QUERIES 
A. Does the international law principle of  self-defence entitle a State to engage in 
non-consensual lethal counter-terrorism operations on the territory of  another 
State against a non-State armed group that poses a direct and immediate 
threat of  attack, even when the armed group concerned has no operational 
connection to its host State? If  so, under what conditions does such a right of  
self-defence arise? Does such a right arise where the territorial State is judged 
to be unable or unwilling to prevent the threat from materializing? If  so, what 
are the criteria for determining “unwillingness” or “inability” to act? 
These questions have frequently been mischaracterized as bearing on 
whether members of  non-State armed groups, such as Al Qaeda, qualify as 
lawful RPA targets. However, that issue is answered by resort to 
international humanitarian law. Instead, the questions posed by Emmerson 
relate to the legality of  RPAs reaching their targets in light of  the territorial 
                                                                                                                                      
Deconstructing the Logic of  International Law, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 77 (2013). 
4. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Rep. of  the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of  
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/59 (Mar. 11, 
2014) (by Ben Emmerson). 
5. Id. ¶¶ 70, 72. 
6. Id. ¶ 72. 
7. Id. ¶ 70, 71. 
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sovereignty enjoyed by the States in which the targets are located. They 
derive from jus ad bellum and the law of  sovereignty. 
It is indisputable that RPA operations may be conducted on another 
State’s territory in two circumstances. First, a territorial State’s consent 
precludes the wrongfulness of  the “internationally wrongful act,” i.e., the 
violation of  territorial sovereignty and unlawful use of  force by the State 
conducting the RPA strike.8 Consent has this effect whether the operation 
is carried out at the territorial State’s request in its own non-international 
armed conflict (e.g., Yemen), as part of  another State’s non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC) that has spilled over into a neighboring State (e.g., 
Afghanistan-Pakistan), or pursuant to the attacking State’s right of  self-
defense (e.g., U.S. counterterrorist operations against Al Qaeda). Second, 
the UN Security Council may authorize strikes in a Chapter VII resolution, 
which it typically does by sanctioning “all necessary means” to accomplish 
a specified objective.9 To date, the Council has never authorized RPA 
strikes as such, although there is no legal obstacle preventing it from 
doing so. 
The controversial issue is whether RPA strikes may be launched 
pursuant to the attacking State’s right of  self-defense in the absence of  the 
territorial State’s consent, or even over its objection. Article 51 of  the UN 
Charter provides that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of  individual or collective self-defence if  an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of  the United Nations . . . .” This provision 
serves as an exception to Article 2(4)’s (and customary law’s) prohibition 
on the threat or use of  force against other States, which would otherwise 
prohibit combat operations on their territory. 
In the RPA context, the threshold question is whether the right of  self-
defense extends to attacks committed by non-State actors. By a restrictive 
view, first articulated in the International Court of  Justice’s Nicaragua 
judgment, hostilities at the armed attack level conducted by groups sent 
“by or on behalf  of  a State,” or a State’s “substantial involvement therein,” 
justify treating the attacking State’s reaction as one of  self-defense.10 The 
Court reiterated this position in two subsequent cases,11 although both 
decisions proved controversial.12 Absent an “operational nexus” to the 
                                                          
8. See G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, art. 20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). 
9. U.N. Charter art. 42. The phrase “all necessary means” is the terminology the Council typically 
employs in a resolution to authorize or mandate a use of  force to accomplish its objective. 
10. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
¶ 195 (June 27). 
11. See Armed Activities on Territory of  the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 
168, ¶¶ 146–47 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of  Construction of  Wall in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9). 
12. See, e.g., Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 337, ¶ 11 (separate opinion of  Judge Simma); Palestinian Territory, 
2004 I.C.J. at 215, ¶ 33 (July 9) (separate opinion of  Judge Higgins); id. at 229–30, ¶ 35 (separate 
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host State, the restrictive view would preclude an extraterritorial RPA 
strike, not because the individuals are unlawful targets, but rather because 
it is unlawful for the attacking State to cross the border in self-defense. 
The better position is that these pronouncements are normatively 
obsolescent. State practice and expressions of  opinio juris in the aftermath 
of  the 9/11 attacks demonstrate that many (arguably most) States now 
interpret Article 51 and customary international law as including the right 
to forcefully defend against armed attacks conducted autonomously by 
non-State armed groups. In addition to the many operations mounted on 
this basis since then, the evidence includes multiple Security Council 
resolutions citing self-defense adopted in the aftermath of  9/11,13 NATO 
action pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty’s collective defense article,14 
and military support by other States for U.S. operations on the basis of  
collective defense.15 Broad acknowledgement of  Israel’s right to self-
defense against Hezbollah during Operation Change Direction in 2006 
strengthened the case measurably — although Israel faced criticism over 
the proportionality of  its response.16 Moreover, recent U.S. statements on 
the matter, constituting opinio juris, have asserted a right of  self-defense 
against non-State actors.17 
                                                                                                                                      
opinion of  Judge Kooijmans); id. at 242–43, ¶ 6 (declaration of  Judge Buergenthal). 
13. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns, ‘in Strongest Terms’, 
Terrorist Attacks on United States, U.N. Press Release SC/7143 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1372, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1372 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001); S.C. Res. 
1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001); S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 
2002). 
14. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1959, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246. See, e.g., 
Press Release, North Atl. Treaty Org. [NATO], Statement by the North Atlantic Council 124 (Sept. 
12, 2001). NATO deployed AWACS aircraft to patrol U.S. skies. NATO’s Operations 1949 – Present, 
NATO, http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/21/NATO%20Operations,%201949-Present.pdf  (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2014). 
15. Contemporary Practice of  the United States Relating to International Law, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 237, 248 
(Sean D. Murphy ed., 2002). 
16. See, e.g., Provisional Record of  the U.N. Security Council, 61st Sess., 5492d mtg. at 3, U.N. 
Doc. S/PV.5492 (July 20, 2006); see also Michael N. Schmitt, “Change Direction” 2006: Israeli Operations 
in Lebanon and the International Law of  Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 127, 154 (2008). 
17. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE WHITE PAPER, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL 
OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF 
AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 2, available at 
http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/408/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf  [hereinafter White Paper] 
(last visited Aug. 12, 2014); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of  State, Address at the 
Annual Meeting of  the American Society of  International Law:  
The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. For substantiation of  the White Paper, see 
David Kaye, International Law Issues in the Department of  Justice White Paper on Targeted Killing, 17 ASIL 
Insights 8, at n.1 (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/8/international-law-
issues-department-justice-white-paper-targeted-killing#_edn1. 
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Two conditions precedent exist as to the exercise of  the right of  self-
defense.18 First, forceful defensive action must be necessary, in the sense 
that non-forceful options have either been exhausted or will not suffice. 
Thus, for instance, if  cooperative law enforcement would put an end to 
the harmful activities, the law of  self-defense will provide no basis for 
conducting an RPA attack. Second, forceful defensive operations must be 
proportionate. That is, only the amount of  force required to block the 
imminent attack, stop the on-going attack, or end the campaign is allowed. 
Since RPA operations are precise, employ relatively small weapons, and 
involve no human penetration of  territory, they generally comply with 
this requirement.19  
Assuming for the sake of  analysis that the right of  self-defense extends 
to attacks by armed groups, may RPA strikes be mounted non-
consensually across a border in response to those attacks? The issue arises 
when the territorial State refuses consent, when insufficient time to secure 
consent and still mount the strike exists, or when seeking consent will alert 
the targets. There are two schools of  thought.  
By the first, sovereignty reigns supreme.20 Despite maturation of  the 
right of  self-defense against armed attack by a non-State armed group, the 
veil of  territorial sovereignty may not be pierced by the RPA operation. 
The remedy for attacks by armed groups in such cases is cooperative law 
enforcement. It is only when the territorial State itself  has conducted the 
armed attack — or the armed group’s attack is attributable to the territorial 
State as a matter of  law — that the sovereignty rights of  the territorial 
State yield to the self-defense rights of  the attacking State, thereby 
permitting an RPA strike against the territorial State. 
A more compelling school of  thought, adopted by the United States, 
balances the territorial State’s sovereignty interests against the victim State’s 
right of  self-defense in what is known as the “unwilling or unable” test.21 
                                                          
18. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 43, 73–74, 76 (Nov. 6); Legality of  Threat or 
Use of  Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 41 (July 8); Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 176, 194 (June 27). These 
preconditions to the exercise of  the right of  self-defense in the jus ad bellum are completely different 
than the jus in bello (IHL) principle and rule of  the same name. 
19. Jus ad bellum proportionality must be distinguished from the IHL rule of  proportionality, 
which prohibits attacks that are expected to cause collateral damage that is excessive to the 
anticipated military advantage. Jus ad bellum proportionality deals with the amount of  force used to 
accomplish the defensive aim, not the collateral impact on the civilian population. See Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of  Victims 
of  International Armed Conflicts arts. 51, 57, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional 
Protocol I].  
20. E.g., Island of  Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) (“Sovereignty 
in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of  the 
globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of  any other State, the functions of  a State.”).  
21. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of  the United States, Remarks by the President at the 
National Defense University (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
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This test allows penetration of  the territorial State in order to conduct 
RPA operations against the group responsible for the underlying armed 
attack if  the territorial State either fails to put an end to the group’s 
activities on its territory or is incapable of  doing so, as in the case of  a 
State that lacks adequate means of  responding quickly.  
Since the approach represents a balancing of  rights, the State 
conducting the RPA strikes must limit operations to those strictly required 
to terminate armed attacks by the group. The attacking State must first 
insist that the territorial State comply with its obligation to police its 
territory. Of  course, this requirement is subject to the condition of  
feasibility. In some cases, for instance, hesitation to act may allow the non-
State actors involved to escape.  
No precise criteria for application of  the test exist. Rather, each case 
must be evaluated on its own merits taking into consideration such factors 
as the window of  opportunity to effectively conduct the operation, 
operational capabilities of  the territorial State, the relationship between the 
armed group and the territorial State, the relationship between the State 
wishing to conduct RPA operations and the territorial State, the prior 
history of  RPA operations into the territorial State, the effectiveness of  
previous territorial State efforts to police its territory, the significance of  
the target, the availability of  assets to conduct the operation, and so on. 
Ultimately, the test is that which always applies to the use of  force in 
international law — reasonableness. Therefore, the question is whether a 
reasonable State in same or similar circumstances would conclude that the 
territorial State is either unwilling or unable to address the situation in a 
manner that obviates the need for a defensive RPA attack. 
                                                                                                                                      
office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university (“[W]e act . . . when there are no 
other governments capable of  effectively addressing the threat.”) [hereinafter NDU Remarks]; THE 
WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, FACT SHEET: U.S. POLICY STANDARDS AND 
PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE 
UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES (May 23, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-
procedures-use-force-counterterrorism (requiring “[a]n assessment that the relevant governmental 
authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the 
threat to U.S. persons”); John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & 
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security at Harvard Law School: 
Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-
our-security-adhering-our-values-an (“[W]e reserve the right to take unilateral action if  or when other 
governments are unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions themselves.”). For academic 
treatment of  the subject, see Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for 
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012). For post-9/11 analysis, see Michael N. 
Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 540–43 (2003). 
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B. Is the international law principle of  self-defence confined to situations in which an 
armed attack has already taken place, or does it entitle a State to carry out 
pre-emptive military operations against a non-State armed group on the 
territory of  another State, without the territorial State’s consent, where it 
judges that there is an imminent risk of  attack to its own interests? If  so, 
how is imminence to be defined? 
Assuming, arguendo, that the law of  self-defense extends to attacks by 
non-State armed groups, the question arises as to when that right matures. 
Self-evidently, it attaches once an armed attack is underway. The prevailing 
view is that self-defense is also available against attacks that are 
imminent.22 Such anticipatory self-defense was traditionally viewed as 
temporal in character, reflecting the State-based nature of  armed attacks. 
The attacks typically were preceded by such indications and warnings as 
heightened tension, mobilization of  the reserves, and movement of  forces 
towards the border. The time and visibility involved generally afforded the 
target State an opportunity to prepare itself  and for diplomacy to 
deescalate the situation.  
This approach is ill-suited to twenty-first century armed attacks by non-
State armed groups.23 Their modus operandi is typically to act without 
warning; indeed, in light of  their comparative disadvantage in capability, 
most pending attacks by armed groups can be foiled if  uncovered. 
Moreover, in an era in which weapons of  mass destruction are increasingly 
available, an attack can be catastrophic. In light of  this contemporary 
reality, the sensible interpretation of  the norm is one that allows defensive 
uses of  force, including RPA strikes, when the group in question possesses 
the means and intent to conduct an attack, and waiting to act defensively 
may sacrifice the opportunity to mount an effective defense.24 The U.S. 
government has now embraced this “last window of  opportunity” test.25 
To the extent a State has a right to act anticipatorily against a non-State 
                                                          
22. The criterion is drawn from the exchange of  letters following the Caroline incident. See Letter 
from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of  State, to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in 2 A 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1906) (permitting action where the 
“necessity of  self-defence [is] instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of  means, and no 
moment for deliberation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
23. The first public indication of  a shift in interpretation of  the law of  self-defense in light of  
this new reality was the 2002 National Security Strategy. See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (Sept. 17, 2002), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 
24. See Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus ad Bellum: A 
Normative Framework, 56 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2008). 
25. See White Paper, supra note 17, at 7. The author first proposed the interpretation in 2002. 
Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of  Force in International Law, 32 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 
53, 110 (2002), reprinted in MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE USE OF FORCE 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (MARSHALL CTR. PAPER NO. 5, 2002). 
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armed group, it may do so without the consent of  the territorial State in 
the “unwilling/unable” circumstances described above. 
A related requirement of  self-defense is immediacy, which limits the 
period following an armed attack during which defensive uses of  force can 
be mounted. As to the scope of  the requirement, the critical point is that 
the operation in question must not constitute punishment or retribution.26 
Once the armed attack is definitively over, any right to cross into another 
State’s territory to conduct RPA strikes, whether consensual or not, 
is extinguished. 
It is necessary to distinguish individual acts from campaigns. If  the 
armed group concerned is engaged in a series of  attacks against a State, 
that State need not treat every one of  the group’s operations as separate 
for the purpose of  self-defense, such that the imminency and immediacy 
criteria apply to each.27 Rather, it may conduct RPA strikes against the 
group until its campaign is over. 
C. Does the international humanitarian law test of  intensity of  hostilities (which is 
one of  the criteria determining whether a non-international armed conflict 
exists) require an assessment of  the severity and frequency of  armed attacks 
occurring within defined geographical boundaries? In applying the intensity test 
to a non-State armed group operating transnationally, is it legitimate to 
aggregate armed attacks occurring in geographically diverse locations in order 
to determine whether, taken as a whole, they cross the intensity threshold so as 
to amount to a non-international armed conflict? If  it is possible for a State to 
be engaged in a non-international armed conflict with a non-State armed 
group operating transnationally, does this imply that a non-international 
armed conflict can exist which has no finite territorial boundaries? 
To fully understand these questions, it is necessary to differentiate jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello terminology. “Armed attack” is a term of  art in the 
former that represents the point at which a victim State may use force to 
defend itself. Emmerson’s questions, despite mention of  armed attack, 
refer instead to the jus in bello issue of  when does an “armed conflict” exist 
such that IHL governs how the operation is executed. The determining 
factors are the frequency and intensity of  the “hostilities,” not aggregation 
of  “armed attacks.”  
This issue is normatively critical because, absent an armed conflict, 
human rights and domestic law, rather than IHL, set the legal parameters 
                                                          
26. For discussion and application of  the immediacy concept in the context of  cyber conflict, see 
TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 66 (Michael 
N. Schmitt ed., 2013). The principle of  immediacy was acknowledged by all members of  the 
International Group of  Experts who participated in the cyber warfare project. 
27. See Schmitt, supra note 25, at 75–76; SCHMITT, supra note 25, at 23–25. 
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for RPA strikes. The practical difference is that IHL allows for attacks 
based solely on the status of  the target (e.g., a member of  an organized 
armed group that is party to the conflict), whereas human rights law only 
allows attacks when necessary for the defense of  oneself  or others; it does 
not contemplate status-based targeting.28 
Unlike international armed conflict, which is armed conflict between 
two or more States, a NIAC — armed conflict between an organized 
armed group and a State or between two or more organized armed 
groups — only commences once an intensity threshold has been crossed. 
It is generally accepted that “situations of  internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of  violence and other 
acts of  a similar nature” are insufficiently intense.29 The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has further indicated 
that the “armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups” must be “protracted” in order to satisfy the requirement.30 
All acts of  violence occurring within a single State may be aggregated to 
meet the intensity threshold. This is the logical result of  the ICTY’s 
conclusion that there is no zone of  hostilities within a State during a 
NIAC beyond which IHL ceases to apply.31 In other words, even if  
sections of  a country are peaceful, IHL applies throughout the country 
once a NIAC is underway. IHL experts also generally agree that in the 
physical locations to which IHL applies, all acts related to the conflict in 
question may be aggregated. The question, therefore, is where IHL applies. 
Consensus as to the geographical scope of  IHL, and therefore a NIAC, 
is lacking. There are three views.32 Common Article 3 of  the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions’ “in the territory of  one of  the High Contracting Parties” 
text provides the basis for the traditional view,33 which limits IHL 
                                                          
28. See Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of  Crime and the Treatment of  
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of  Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials, 112–13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1991). 
29. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of  Victims of  Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. This treaty requirement is generally acknowledged as a 
correct articulation of  the customary norm. See also Rome Statute of  the International Criminal 
Court art. 8(2)(d), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
30. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
31. See id. ¶¶ 69–70; see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, 
Judgment, ¶¶ 56–57 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).  
32. See Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of  Non-International Armed Conflict, 90 INT’L 
L. STUD. 1, 9–18 (2014). 
33. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention 
(II) for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of  
Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 
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applicability to the confines of  the State. By this approach, an RPA strike 
justified solely on the identity of  the target would be unlawful beyond the 
State’s borders. 
The advent of  transnational terrorism and the propensity of  modern 
NIACs to spill over into neighboring States have rendered this view 
dubious. Today, the international legal community is broadly receptive to 
an interpretation of  IHL that extends its applicability to territory in 
neighboring States into which a conflict has spilled. The ICRC has adopted 
this position,34 and the jurisdictional provisions of  the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute support it.35 Beyond the spillover 
territory, RPA strikes just based on target identity would be impermissible. 
A third view, which I support, focuses not on the location of  hostilities, 
but rather on the parties to a conflict. IHL has historically classified 
conflicts based on the parties thereto and, for NIACs, the existence of  a 
level of  hostilities justifying attachment of  international legal constraints.36 
So long as the armed group in question is sufficiently “organized” and the 
attendant hostilities cross the requisite intensity threshold, a NIAC exists, 
and status-based targeting is permissible. The question of  whether military 
operations related to that conflict may lawfully be conducted in a particular 
location is determined by the jus ad bellum (consent, unwilling/unable), 
instead of  IHL.  
D. Does international humanitarian law permit the targeting of  persons directly 
participating in hostilities who are located in a non-belligerent State and, if  so, 
in what circumstances? 
In both international and non-international armed conflicts, civilians are 
protected from attack, but only, as discussed below in Question G, for 
such time as they do not directly participate in the hostilities.37 As an 
aspect of  IHL, the rule’s operation is limited to locations where that body 
of  law applies. Therefore, the three schools of  thought presented in 
response to the previous set of  questions determine whether direct 
participants may be attacked using RPAs beyond the borders of  a State 
                                                                                                                                      
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War art. 3, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
34. Int’l Comm. of  the Red Cross [ICRC], International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of  
Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 9–10, Doc. No. 31IC/11/5.1.2 (2011), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-
conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf. 
35. See Statute of  the International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 1, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).  
36. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT, 2004, JOINT SERV. PUBL’N 383, ¶¶ 3.2, 3.5, 15.2 (U.K.). 
37. Additional Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 51(3); Additional Protocol II, supra note 29, art. 
13(3). 
24 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST [Vol. 55 
involved in a NIAC. By the first, they may not be, absent a justification 
consistent with human rights law (i.e., immediate defense of  self  or 
others); by the second, they may be attacked only while in the spillover 
area; and by the third approach, direct participants are targetable so long as 
the RPA strike may be conducted in the location consistent with 
the jus ad bellum. 
It should be noted that the legal basis for determining that a particular 
individual is targetable using an RPA is typically that the individual qualifies 
as a member of  an “organized armed group,” a notion discussed in 
Question F, not that he is a civilian directly participating in the hostilities. 
However, the geographical limitations pertaining to direct participants and 
members of  organized armed groups are identical. 
E. Do the pattern and frequency of  the armed attacks currently being perpetrated 
by Al-Qaida, and the various affiliate organizations in different parts of  the 
world that claim allegiance to Al-Qaida, satisfy (or continue to satisfy) the 
criteria of  organization and intensity required under international 
humanitarian law to qualify as a state of  armed conflict? 
The answer to this question is, of  course, fact dependent. As confirmed 
by President Obama, RPAs and other counterterrorist operations have 
significantly disrupted Al Qaeda as a centralized terrorist organization.38 
The primary threat today is instead from the “emergence of  various al 
Qaeda affiliates.”39 This begs the question of  whether the United States 
continues to be engaged in a NIAC with the organization.  
As discussed, acts may be aggregated to reach the intensity threshold so 
long as they occur in an area in which an armed conflict exists. The 
existence of  an armed conflict depends not only on intensity, but also on 
whether the armed group is sufficiently “organized.”40 Although the 
requisite level of  organization is not that of  regular armed forces, it is 
generally understood as requiring some sort of  “chain of  command.” It is 
insufficient, for example, that the groups concerned share a common 
cause or even proclaim allegiance to a purported leader. Rather, the 
organization, albeit perhaps decentralized in structure, must act as a related 
entity that engages in operations that are to an extent cooperative and 
collaborative. Reduced to basics, it must be sensible to characterize the 
group as a single party to the conflict. 
                                                          
38. NDU Remarks, supra note 21.  
39. Id. 
40. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); see also 
Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of  Opposition Fighters in a Non-International Armed Conflict, 88 INT’L L. 
STUD. 119, 126–35 (2012). 
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The more successful counterterrorist operations are in disrupting Al 
Qaeda, the less likely this will be the case. To the extent that Al Qaeda 
affiliates operate independently, separate NIACs could emerge from the 
previous single conflict. Each of  the conflicts would then have to qualify 
by the intensity and organization criteria on its own merits. It is possible, 
therefore, that the U.S. is, or will soon find itself, engaged in NIACs with 
certain terrorist groups, and accordingly able to conduct status-based RPA 
strikes against its members, whereas its operations vis-à-vis others will be 
limited to law enforcement consistent with international human 
rights norms. 
F. Assuming that a non-international armed conflict exists, does the test of  
“continuous combat function”, as elaborated by the International Committee 
of  the Red Cross for determining whether a person is a “member” of  an 
armed group (such that that person may be targeted with lethal force at any 
time) reflect customary international law? If  not, what is the correct test? 
Between 2003 and 2008, the International Committee of  the Red Cross 
(ICRC) conducted an expert-driven process to examine the concept of  
direct participation. The result was its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of  
Direct Participation in Hostilities.41 During the process, the experts accepted 
the premise that members of  “organized armed groups” were assimilated 
to members of  the regular armed forces for the purposes of  targeting. In 
particular, group members are targetable at all times, as distinct from the 
“for such time” limitation vis-à-vis individuals. However, for the ICRC, only 
those members of  the group who have a “continuous combat function” 
are subject to such targeting.42 Other members may not be attacked unless 
they are engaged in activities qualifying as direct participation.43 A 
continuous combat function is a regular role in the group involving 
activities that somehow directly harm the enemy.  
The ICRC’s distinction between members of  the same organized armed 
group provoked controversy among the experts.44 In particular, some of  
them, including myself, objected on the basis that IHL does not 
distinguish members of  the regular armed forces who have a combat 
function from those who do not.45 With the exception of  medical and 
                                                          
41. ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of  Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
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42. Id. at 27. 
43. Id. at 34–35. 
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religious personnel, all members of  the group are targetable throughout 
their enlistment. To afford greater protection to members of  an organized 
armed group — who enjoy no right to participate in the conflict in the 
first place — than to members of  the regular armed forces appeared to 
these experts as unacceptably incongruent and contrary to IHL’s object 
and purposes. 
For the experts who are of  this view, the appropriate criterion for 
around-the-clock targetability is membership in a group that has an 
express purpose of  conducting hostilities. It must be cautioned that 
targetability does not extend to individuals who merely support the group, 
as in financing its general operations or periodically offering its members 
sanctuary. Such individuals must be treated as civilians who may only be 
attacked for such time as they engage in acts qualifying as direct 
participation in hostilities. 
Some groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, have both military and 
nonmilitary wings. The latter may provide, for example, education, medical 
care, and other services unrelated to the hostilities. Only those in the 
military wing are targetable as members of  an organized armed group.46 
Individuals who have functions in both the military and nonmilitary 
components are targetable based on their membership in the former. 
G. Does the guidance promulgated by the International Committee of  the Red 
Cross for “direct participation in hostilities” reflect customary international 
law? In particular, does an individual who has participated in hostilities cease 
to be targetable during a pause in his or her active involvement? Does 
providing accommodation, food, financing, recruitment or logistical support 
amount to “direct participation in hostilities” for targeting purposes? 
In the Interpretive Guidance, the ICRC suggested that direct participation 
consists of  three cumulative constitutive elements. First, the “act must be 
likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of  a 
party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or 
destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack.” Second, 
“there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to 
result.” Third, a nexus must exist between the act in question and the 
armed conflict.47  
The experts involved in the process generally accepted the three as 
reflecting customary law. However, opinions sometimes differed over their 
precise application to particular types of  activities. For example, the ICRC 
opined that serving as a voluntary human shield or (perhaps) building 
improvised explosive devices did not qualify on the basis that the causal 
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connection between these acts and the ensuing harm is indirect.48 I was 
among the experts who countered that such an interpretation of  direct 
causation is overly restrictive.  
So long as the activities cited in the above question are engaged in 
generally, rather than to facilitate a particular operation, they would likely 
not qualify as direct participation. For instance, and although the experts 
are not unanimous in this regard, contributing financially to an 
organization in a general way is not direct participation, whereas 
specifically funding a particular operation would qualify.49 Similarly, 
providing general logistics support, such as transporting material for an 
organized armed group, would not amount to direct participation, while 
transporting equipment to the group for a specific imminent 
attack would.50  
Disagreement also exists over the temporal aspect of  direct 
participation. A State conducting an RPA strike against a direct participant 
must be sensitive to the limitation that the attack may only take place “for 
such time” as the individual is so participating.51 The precise meaning of  
the phrase remains elusive. According to the Interpretive Guidance, 
“[m]easures preparatory to the execution of  a specific act of  direct 
participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the return 
from the location of  its execution, constitute an integral part of  that act.”52 
Between individual acts of  participation, the individual regains protection 
from attack. An alternative approach, one I support, interprets the phrase 
more broadly.53 By it, individuals who engage in repeated acts of  direct 
participation remain targetable throughout the period during which those 
acts occur.  
H. In the context of  non-international armed conflict, when (and under what 
circumstances) does international humanitarian law impose an obligation to 
capture rather than kill a legitimate military target where this is feasible? 
The issue of  capture or kill surfaced during the final year of  the direct 
participation project. According to the ICRC, “the kind and degree of  
force which is permissible against persons not entitled to protection 
against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to 
accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.”54 
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This comment evoked controversy among the experts and sparked a 
debate that continues today.55 
It is militarily illogical to kill the enemy when capture is possible because 
detainees often provide useful intelligence. However, I was among the 
experts who took the position that as a matter of  law an individual becomes 
targetable once he or she qualifies as an enemy combatant, directly 
participates in hostilities, or is a member of  an organized armed group. 
For these experts, IHL specifically delineates the circumstances in which 
such individuals may not be attacked, as when they have been captured or 
are wounded.56 Military necessity serves not as a separate rule, but rather 
as a foundational principle of  IHL that has already been factored into the 
specific rules. In other words, absent a specific rule of  IHL prohibiting 
attack on an individual, such as the prohibition on attacking civilians or 
application of  the rule of  proportionality, he or she may be attacked 
without consideration of  the extent to which the attack is 
militarily necessary.  
CONCLUSION 
Policy makers sometimes embrace normative opaqueness in the belief  
that it allows for political and operational flexibility. In fact, it often does. 
Yet, when the task at hand involves lethal activity, there is a strong moral 
argument for States committed to the international rule of  law to set forth 
the legal basis for their operations. Doing so is particularly imperative in 
light of  customary international law’s reliance on State practice and 
expressions of  opinio juris. Whether States will heed Special Rapporteur 
Emmerson’s call to set forth their legal position on RPA operations 
remains to be seen. However, that States engaged in any lethal activity 
should be willing to coherently and transparently articulate a legal basis 
therefor would seem self-evident. 
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